Thursday, January 27, 2011

Three China Predictions

I just came across the following link, that suggests that many investors are now seeing an abrupt end to China's rapidly expanding economy, a view the TSI has held for years.

As a bonus link, I include the Economist website that has moved forward the date of China's ascendancy to the world's largest economy. In essence, the Economist assumes that China's nominal GDP will grow strongly, even as real GDP growth begins to decline (due to inflation running at 4%), but that since the Yuan will continue to appreciate against the dollar, high inflation will actually serve to help make China richer, faster.

I promised you 3 predictions about China, though, and here they are:

1) China will become the largest economy in the world in the 2020s

2) By 2050, it will have fallen back to third.

3) Slower economic growth will provoke a political crisis in China, and this will lead to a major recession and a fall in China's output.

My rationale:

1) China's continued growth coupled with inflation and a slow but steady increase in the value of the Yuan, will enable China to overtake the US sometime in the 2020s. I now think it unlikely, given policy preferences in both countries, for this not to happen. However....

2) China's economic "miracle" is coming to an end, and it is being challenged already by India, whose macroeconomic situation appears stronger. However, to be 3rd, means to be passed by 2 countries, and the other country will be ..... drumroll please .... the United States. Thus, I am predicting that China's growth rate will fall below that of the US after 2030.

Let us consider how this happens, to increase economic growth you have to increase either labor (hours worked) or capital (productivity). The rapid productivity gains that every "tiger" economy, be it Japan, Korea, Taiwan, or Ireland, indeed every industrializing country, experiences in early stages of industrialization inevitably comes to an end. Remember that it took Britain 100 years, the Americans 70, the Germans 50, and pretty much everyone else 30 years to convert, with higher rates of growth the later a country started. The reason for this is not leadership, or "economic system" but simple math - the later you start industrializing the cheaper any given productivity-enhancing technology is, thus you can "skip" generations of technologies (the Chinese did not start industrializing by using Arkwrights Water Frame to drive their textiles), and move productivity ahead faster.

Having caught up several generations of technology, China must now deploy more expensive technologies which require more sophistication, and China doesn't produce any of them. While they can purchase much of this (from Germany and elsewhere), it is not clear that Chinese firms have the education an educated workforce and competent corporate managers. It is not clear that an education system run by the Communist Party can create such a workforce. It has not succeeded anywere else. Services productivity, the driver of eocnomic growth for developed economies, is even harder to sustain without specific management skillsets, suggesting that the services sector in China will remain a productivity laggard, even as it becomes the largest part of the economy beyond 2030. I suspect that Chinese education will prove to be inadequate to the task, suggesting that their productivity may grow more slowly than that of the US, and more on European levels of around 1% per year, particularly after 2030.

But slower and slowing productivity growth is only half the story - the other half is labor. China's labor market has benefitted from abundant rural labor and the "demographic dividend" which occurs at early stages of low birth rates. With fewer children being born, the share of the population that is working age rises, increasing output per head, and crucially, enabling women to enter the workforce in significant numbers and to invest in becoming middle- or highly-skilled (thus increasing both hours worked and output per hour). This dividend might be considered something of a "loan" because it has a nasty consequence: eventually, low birthrates and few children leads to fewer new labor force entrants.

If the situation becomes particularly acute, as it is in Japan, Italy, much of Eastern Europe and now China, the actual labor force can shrink. So while adding workers (or making them work longer) adds to GDP, fewer workers, will subtract from it. Moreover, increasingly wealthy Chinese may decide to consume more leisure time (everyone else who gets rich does), which would mean fewer workers working fewer hours. A decline in the labor force of even 0.2% would be enough to convert the 1% productivity gain into a mere 0.8% growth rate. A more severe decline could virtually wipe out all economic growth (see Japan for a real life example of how this happens, note that huge government spending, or "investment" if you are of a lefty persuasion, has failed to change the basic math).

Even if you believe China can sustain Anglo levels of productivity growth, a declining workforce means that China will grow more slowly than the US, where labor force growth continues apace, in part do to strong net immigration. The Chinese could also seek to import labor from elsewhere, but culturally Asian econmies are not immigrant friendly.

But wait, I hear some voices say - what about the rise in the currency? Clearly the rise in the Yuan will aid China's ascension. Indeed, it is because of this that I believe China cannot help but become the largest economy in the world. If the currencies were allowed to float, China's currency might increase by 30-35% against the dollar as everyone who is currently shut out of holding Yuan piles in. Because China has a managed-peg, or allows only a bit of adjustment each year, there is lots of demand to hold Yuan and apparently little downside. If you can borrow in US dollars at next to zero percent and invest in China with at 7-10% (holding Chinese short term paper) and you "know" that China's currency is going to rise against the dollar, you essentially have a case of risk-free arbitrage in which you can borrow cheap, earn positive carry on the interest differential and experience the compounding effect of having the currency you are holding rise against the one you are borrowing. An investor's wet dream. All you need is leverage....

However, the macroeconomic rationale for holding Yuan fades as China's status as the boom economy does. Therefore, that which investors "know" turns out to be wrong, and the UNWINDING of those positions will lead to a surge in the value of the dollar. Thus, I expect the dollar to rise against the Yuan after 2030 on macro fundamentals.

Ergo, the US reclaims its lead over China. This post is too long to cover India, but suffice it to say that India has many advantages, including the fact that its economy is more open, it's currency convertible, English is widely spoken, it has focused on services and on training top management talent, and it is now looking to manufacturing to employ more of its poor, oh, and India's birthrate, while falling, remains above replacement rate, which means it will have a growing labor force over the next 4 decades. It's less rapid growth is more sustainable, and its political system better able to resist a major social crisis, which gets us to our final prediction.

3) A final factor that will impede China's growth and rise, and will contribute to a currency crisis, is the political crisis almost certain to accompany an abrupt end to Chinese growth. The Chinese have become accustomed to getting much richer each year, and have been willing to put up with quite a bit of grief from Communist party apparatchiks in order to maintain it. Rural folks who feel left out of the boom have been demonstrating against the Party in increasing numbers. The Party has been able to hold onto the critical support of coastal regions, where the money and the power lie. Once these people experience the disillusionment that inevitably comes from having their expectations disappointed, particularly those among the rapidly expanding lower middle class that sees itself on the first rung of a ladder that will carry it to the wealth of the upper class Chinese, if not in this generation than in the next, the Communist Party will have difficulty maintaining legitimacy. It is possible that the entire edifice will collapse. It is also possible that it will increasingly resort to nationalism as a justification for strong central command, which may result in China getting involved in regional wars, wars it may not win (though it may not "lose" them either). Either way, a crisis within the Communist Party, or within the political system more generally will lead to major disruption and a withdrawal of foreign investment and a fall in domestic investment as well. Lower investment means lower productivity, and indeed, output will fall for the first time since the 1970s.

I suspect that the disruption will be on a scale with that of Russia, though different, since China is building better institutions than the creaking Soviet sytem did. If the CCP tries to hold power by force, as they did in 1989, the situation could be particularly bad. Ultimately, China will come through it, but with a possible decade of political turmoil holding back productivity gains, the legitimacy of its government undermined and a major foreign crisis, such as a war with India or Taiwan, will leave its position in the world much diminished. Indeed if this crisis comes sooner (with the next leadership transition scheduled to begin in 2012), China may never make it to number 1, with the US able to hold out until the 2030s when it gets passed by India, instead.

And now the best thing about long range predictions - it will be decades before anyone knows if I'm right. But I reiterate my view that investment in China is fraught with danger.

Thursday, December 30, 2010

Has the Stock Market Gotten Riskier? - Investing - Stocks - SmartMoney.com

Why are retail investors leaving equities amid strong returns and strong corporate profitability? 

This is a terrific article about the reasons that the stock market should be stalling.  In short, the market has become more volatile, which, in portfolio theory, means that it involves more risk and therefore require a higher risk premium.

The article suggests that valuation shouldn’t be the source of the problem, given that investors were willing to pay more in 2007 for assets that had a lower earnings yield.

Instead, it suggests that the sharp increase in the number of large movement days, up or down, that have occurred in the last 25, 15 and 10 years (2/3rds of extreme price movements since 1950 have been crammed into the last 15 years), has changed investors perspective on the “riskiness” of the market.

Portfolio theory says that assets are priced relative to each other, and that an investor begins with a “Risk-free” rate, one where the exact prices and returns are calculable with 100% knowledge, e.g. a Treasury bill.  Riskier assets should require a higher risk premium to compensate the investor for taking on the additional risk.

Risk is considered to be the volatility around an expected return.  If a Risk Free investment guarantees me 2% (no volatility – I will get my expected return, because the US government WILL make the payments it has promised, when it has promised them), then to hold a riskier asset, one where I could lose money (one possible return outcome is negative) I must be able to have a reasonable expectation of finishing well above 2%.  How much exactly is known as the “risk premium”.

Stock prices have risen as the risk free rate has collapsed to near zero – increasing the premium offered by risk assets.  (The risk premium is calculated by taking the expected return of the risk assets minus the risk free rate,  E(r)[Risk Asset] – R(f) rate.  If E(r) remains constant and R(f) gets smaller the spread will increase).

If the original premium is correct, then prices of the risky asset should rise reducing expected returns on the risky asset to the point where expected returns maintain the same risk premium. 

However, if volatility in stock prices rises, the greater risk suggests that the equity risk premium should rise, and therefore, lowering the risk free rate will not raise equity prices as much as would be expected.  In fact, if the risk free rate is perceived to be heavily manipulated, such as by extensive central bank intervention (QE2, anyone), then it may not be perceived as the true “risk free” rate.

The article suggests that retail stock investors may be catching on to this, since, in spite of the strong equity returns since March 2009, investors have yanked over $100 bn out of equity mutual funds (that has to putting hurt into someone’s management fees … wealth managers be warned).  The article notes, rightly that dividend yields (which reduce the volatility of returns by adding a regular payment that is not subject to market pricing) have collapsed from 5% to 2% over the same time period (that is, since 1950).

I think the writer underestimates the significance of the lowered expectations of returns.  For years, investors were fed a steady diet of the idea that 1) equity premia were too high, 2) that the stock market experienced a geometric growth average of around 10% – at least since 1926, and 3) that over the “long term”, the market goes up.  Thus, what financial “professionals” were selling to retail investors was something like a turbo-charged savings account.  In exchange for “temporary” losses, an investor – really a saver – could earn a high return on their savings.  Wealth building 11% returns were to be expected.

Of course, it hasn’t turned out that way.  Geometric returns since 1926 have fallen, as stocks have moved sideways for 10 years, earning only the dividend yield.  Americans shouldn’t feel too bad – if you invested in Japanese equities anytime since the early 1980s and have held, you have experienced negative returns, money invested in 1989 is still underwater by 70%.

But here is the thing – portfolio theory says that given a specific level of volatility an appropriate risk premium can be determined.  I think that the risk premium is also a factor of expected returns.  11% returns, when compounded over decades, produce very positive financial outcomes.  Lower that amount, to 8% or in my opinion a more realistic 6%, and all of a sudden, dreams of big houses, vacation homes and a boat begin to look less like sure things, and purchasing equities with savings begins to look like a risky way to pay for healthcare and food in retirement – you know, the stuff our parents and grandparents purchase.

Suddenly, the stock market doesn’t look like the best place to put one’s savings.  And so, the retail investor wants to put more money into lower volatility assets, to be sure to have something left with which to purchase necessities.  It may require increasing the amount one saves from earnings dramatically.

The article’s author does suggest a good additional approach – create an asset of your own by starting a business.  As he notes, most of the inputs are inexpensive right now, and with few attractive options to invest your money in portfolio assets, a business may be the best wealth builder yet.

Here is the link.

Has the Stock Market Gotten Riskier? - Investing - Stocks - SmartMoney.com

Friday, December 10, 2010

The US Midterm's Unwritten Story

2010 was a generational election.

Immense amounts of ink have been spilled talking about the Tea Party and the causes of the Republican victory - economic distress, Democratic legislative priorities, poor "communication" of initiatives, lack of youth voters, and the like. What you haven't heard about is a changing of the guard, generationally. This will have profound implications for politics and the economy (and macro investment factors) for the next several electoral cycles.

America has at times had major elections which have seen a change in the age of its officials. We tend to notice this more directly when presidential generations change, such as in 1960 or 1992. But Congressional elections have also been subject to generational change, and with it a change in the political tenor of the country.

The Generational Divide

Many people would argue that the boom runs until 1964, when the US Census declared an end to the (demographic) Baby Boom. But researchers Strauss and Howe have made a compelling case that the Boomer psychographic ended at 1961, and that those born after are actually part of a different generation, too young to remember the Kennedy administration or his assassination, and too young to have participated in the counterculture movements of the late 1960s (either affirmatively or in awestruck horror).

Thus, those born after 1960 are part of the famous, and maligned "Generation X". Barack Obama is part of this generation, which has different attitudes towards political warfare: less ruthless and much less committed to destruction of one's enemies. Instinctively, younger voters understood when Obama talked about "change" in politics and about a "post-partisan" climate, that he meant that he was not going to continue fighting Boomer culture wars, he was not going to try and remake the country in his own image, and he wasn't committed to the utter destruction of his opponents.

In short, he wasn't going to engage in the shrill histrionics of Rush Limbaugh or Keith Olbermann: classic Boomers. Instead, he was going to be analytical, thoughtful, reasoned and practical, all classic Xer traits. A welcome change, quite frankly. The one commentator to pick up on this was E.J. Dionne, who noted that Obama's campaign was "waging a subtle fight against a generation - my generation, the Baby Boomers".

The brilliance of the subtle campaign was that most Boomers didn't recognize it. Boomer journalists, too self-focused, and still seeing themselves as the drivers of American culture, and perhaps terrified of the implications for their own longevity, failed to cover it. Thus, many Boomers on the left voted for him, thinking that he endorsed their ends and means, and rejected the symbol of their own generation, Hillary Clinton, who both loved engaging in the politics of personal destruction and who was a classic culture warrior. In fact, much of the anti-Hillary vitriol was aimed at preventing her from becoming a symbol of the cultural change her own generation wrought.

Thus, it is no suprise that much of the frustration with Barack Obama on the Left (or as his own Press Secretary said "the Professional Left") is that he doesn't share Boomer attitudes towards political methods and means, even as he espouses fairly leftist policy. Obama's actual policies and policy priorities were a liberal wish list, and yet the Left is totally frustrated, even as Obama has delivered for them. What he seems to lack is the passionate hatred for people who disagree with him, and the Boomer Left, which controls much of the official political media, see the lack of hatred as weakness, even a betrayal of the cause.

The 2010 Election

If the 2008 election saw the Boomers lose the executive branch, 2010 saw a sharp rise in the number of nationally elected officials born after 1960, particularly in the House.

Entering the election, Boomers controlled most Governors mansions, had a narrow majority of Senate seats (though the Silent Generation held most of the committee chairs), and a solid lead in the House, with the other two generations, Silent and Xer approximately equal in size.

As the nearby chart shows, the Silent generation, which has held political power out of all proportion to its size, suffered major setbacks in Congress, losing 1/6th of its House seats and 8 Senate seats, out of 15 it was defending. Just wait as the next 2 electoral cycles see 20 more members up for reelection: I predict that they will lose more than 60% of those seats.

The Boomers fared better, losing a few governorships and actually gaining Senate seats from the Silent, but Xers made gains across the board, governorships, Senate seats, and big gains in the House, putting them well ahead of the Silent there.

Three additional facts are worth noting:

First, is that the Boomers lost share of offices. The generational research done by Strauss and Howe generational power waxes, then wanes, but once it begins waning, it does not wax again. This suggests that Boomer shares of all three institutions will likely decline in each election going forward. The 2010 election signifies that the high-water mark for Boomer power has passed.

Second, the House usually has the lowest average age of all three institutions, and is therefore the first place that a new generation gains power. While the Xers do not yet have a majority, it is reasonable to believe that they will continue to gain seats in all three areas in each of the next several electoral cycles. Much of this will come at the expense of Silent generationl lawmakers getting very long in the tooth, but as the House races show, it will also come at the expense of Boomers.

Third, while Xers will increase their share of government offices, Boomers may get one more crack at the Oval Office. Governorships are still largely in Boomer hands, which means that despite calls for Xers like Chris Christie and Bobby Jindal to run in 2012, Obama will likely face a Boomer challenger in the general election, and possibly in his primary.

Nevertheless, Generation X is now entering midlife and as the Boomer slide into dotage we will increasingly be confronted with Xer America. It has different outlooks, and different politics, and different economics. It will fall to this generation to decide how to confront America's most pressing problems, and their solutions will have big implications for all of us, not least in our investment strategies.

In future posts, we will examine the quintessential Xer political movement, the Tea Party and will also look at how probable Xer policy will affect the macro environment.

Friday, September 03, 2010

Google Adsense

Well, I finally gave up on Google Adsense. Between PIN requirements, endless verification and the like, I just couldn't take it, and was tired of the public service announcements being run on the site.

The problem is, there is really no support. I entered my PIN ages ago, and yet my account kept saying that it required additional verification, but there was no where to input information. Contacting Google, however, is impossible. All they have a lots and lots of forums where users should do the work of providing support.

Even cancellation is difficult, I think because they want to prevent anyone from getting their cash.

So, I am trying someone else, we'll see how this works. Guess I'll need to write some more to get my traffic back up.

UPDATE: as I suspected, AdSense wouldn't let me cancel, because I don't have any record of how many impressions I had on my first day of service (in 2006!). The saga continues.

Friday, December 18, 2009

How long until the job market recovers?

I highly recommend a visit to Mish's Economics blog.

It contains a very good and detailed account of just how long it might take before the US reaches the under 6% unemployment rate enjoyed in 2007 - and the results are NOT PRETTY to say the least.

Given the sheer drop in employed, and the trend in recent recessions for job losses to continue well past the end of the recession, Mish takes the long view and projects unemployment to 2020. With a set of what I believe are realistic projections, he concludes the US will not see 6% unemployment in the next decade. Period.

His report also includes a downloadable spreadsheet to play with the figures - essentially, we would have to create 150k jobs per month for the next ten years - without recession - to get the unemployment rate to 6% in 2020!

I won't repeat his analysis, suffice it to say, it is scary - and what if (as I believe likely) this turns into a double dip recession as the governments around the world find themselves with impossible fiscal situations and begin a process of cutting outlays and raising taxes - with more job losses rather than job gains?

Thanks to John Mauldin for pointing me to this.

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Democrats and Taxes

This might be a bit behind the times, but still, I have to wonder: how can anyone take the Democrats seriously when they suggest that paying taxes is a civic duty, since it is clear that they do not believe that this duty applies to themselves?

Perhaps they assume that most people are cheating and underpaying because they do: they just assume most people cheat at least as much. After all, leftist fascism is at least well intentioned.

For a humorous commentary on exactly the kind of people I mean, listen to Tom Lehrer from 1964.

Like many in the investment blogging community, I am generally a liberatarian. I have voted for the Libertarian Party, although I often think it to be a bunch of wackos - but at least they stand on principle, if often incoherently. I am generally against government schemes to "help" people, because inevitably the politcally weak are fed to the politically powerful. This is done in the name of helping the economically "weak", though in actual fact this isn't necessarily the case either.

Billionaires with Bad Advice (pt 1)

When someone makes it on the Forbes Billionaires list, people tend to take his or her thoughts on business seriously. This is even more the case when that same person became rich by owning a money management firm. Indeed, Forbes takes Kenneth Fisher’s view of the markets so seriously that it has made him its longest running columnist and commentator in its history. Forbes and certainly its readers should rethink the confidence they have placed in him.

Fisher’s latest commentary contains statements that are patently untrue and are likely to mislead investors in ways that will be quite damaging to their portfolios, so I have to respond.

Fisher regularly offers a free commentary to the investing public (“A suprising prediction by Kenneth Fisher”) which is used as a marketing tool for his asset management firm. (It is offered at no cost for answering a short questionnaire about how much money you have and how much 3rd party management interests you). His latest commentary attempts to explain why an investor who has his money with Fisher’s firm should continue to keep it there and fully invested, in spite of the dramatic losses such an investor has sustained following Fisher’s advice. He resorts to two basic claims arguing for remaining fully invested. One is simply false the other is questionable.

The first is a claim about how markets recover. The information implies that markets always recover over a reasonable amount of time and that the long term trend of the market is up. This is simply not true, as anyone who invested in Japan in 1989 can tell you. After the 1929 US market crash, the market took 25 years to regain its high, but at least it spent most of that stretch of 25 years well above the lows it made in 1932. What Japan suggests is that following a massive credit bubble, asset prices can keep falling indefinitely. 20 years after the Nikkei index peak, the market is still making new lows (prices are back to the same levels they were over 25 years ago). In fairness, the US has a few fundamental advantages that suggest that a true Japan scenario is unlikely. On the other hand, the US is also confronted with challenges Japanese firms did not have to deal with: Japan’s struggles to maintain output happened against a backdrop of robust global growth which supported profitable exports.

The key takeaway for the prudent investor is that counting on rising markets is dangerous. Big falls in asset prices do not guarantee that investments will produce satisfactory returns going forward. Lower prices do suggest higher earnings yields, provided that earnings mean-revert. Keynes had it right. “’We simply do not know” if earnings will return to previous trend growth. In Japan, they did not, which is why the market continues to languish more than 80% below its highs. Investors must be wary and continue to be selective in their investment choices as permanent loss of capital is still possible. The focus must be on “return of capital” more than on “return on capital”. They should keep a bias for “cash on the table” in the form of steady, well-protected dividends from firms that have non-cyclical earnings streams, coupled with solid balance sheets that could be financed from operating cash flow.

Sunday, March 08, 2009

Warren Buffett's Letter

Warren Buffett had his worst year ever in 2008. This is not surprising, since it was the worst year for the stock market in Buffett's investing life. Personally, I found the letter thinner on content than usual. There were not pithy observations on accounting rules, nor a simple explanation of the credit markets nor the currency markets. Even his discussion of Berkshire's businesses seemed a bid weak. Only in his explanation of his derivates book did his explanation of his thinking on how to price assets really shine. Nevertheless, I take four points from his letter.

1. Even investing geniuses are still human. Buffett acknowledges many mistakes this year, some are sins of commission and some of omission. As James B. Stewart of Smart Money observes, even Buffett can get caught up in the euphoria. I also made two sins of omission in 2008: not selling Bank of America stock when they acquired Merrill Lynch and not selling Bassett furniture immediately when it became clear that my outlook for the economy (that it would be dismal and that consumer durables would be particularly hard hit) was correct.

In the first case, I liked the strength of the commercial and retail banking franchise of BoA, and assumed that they had an idea of how to integrate Merrill Lynch retail broking and wealth management into their branches, which would be both cost saving and revenue raising at the same time. They may yet execute such a plan, but I suspect that the real hope was to vertically integrate along the asset backed security value chain: originating mortgages, bundling and selling Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) all in house. That this will be difficult, if not impossible in the short term, is obvious, to say nothing of the credit quality of the combined balance sheet.

In the second case, I was simply blinded by my own assessment that BSET trades for far less than the value of its assets. Indeed, at this point, BSET may be more valuable dead than alive. The real problem was a conditional liability that I missed in the financial statements. Bassett has largely guaranteed their franchisees' leases, and this is a very large number. If, as the market clearly believes likely, many franchisees default, Bassett will be left to find a new tenant, or take over (loss-making) operations directly. Since retail storefronts are now a dime-a-dozen, the probability is quite high, that the company will be left holding the bag for a large amount of non-performing real estate. Ouch. Still, the new store format to which they are migrating does indeed seem to be helping sales, and with a strengthening dollar, the imported furniture that they sell may enable them to maintain margins and supported by cash flows from their investment portfolio, they may get through the next 24 months and recover. One can only hope.

So, sins of omission, but perhaps I shouldn't take it too hard.

2. Buy and hold of passive investments doesn't really work, even for great investors. Buffett has suffered huge declines on his public investments, including American Express, Coca-Cola, Burlington Northern and others. Many are treasured firms whose stock he has owned for years. It begs the question: if the best investor of all time cannot make money "buying and holding" then what should the rest of us do?

In my own portfolio, I have one "permanent" holding, and it is Colgate-Palmolive. This is a stock whose forward dividend yield is now at almost 3%, which continues to raise its dividend by 10% or more per year, which continues to repurchase stock in huge quantities and whose investor-friendly activities are backstopped by rising earnings that I project to be over $4.20 per share in 2009 (providing a dividend coverage ratio of 2.38). Plus, the stock is in a recession-proof business and has avoided making big acquistions. In short, it is the perfect investment.

But I have also watched the value of that investment decline from $80 a share to $56 (I purchased in the low $40s, so I have still had decent returns). Admittedly, at $80 a share in early 2008, it was a bit pricey at 20x forward earnings. Plus, it trades at 10x book (but earns about 90% on book). Why didn't I sell?

The truth is, Buffett has a good reason to have "permanent" holdings. In most cases, his ownership stake is so large and his portfolio so carefully monitored that he would have difficulty disposing of his positions. If Buffett is selling, after all, how exceptional can the value be? Retail investors, myself included, lack this rationale. Even if we hold a few blocks, and few of us do, our transactions are unlike to affect the markets, unless the stocks involved are very thinly traded. So, I conclude that the focus on "permanent" holdings, indeed the very idea of "buy and hold" is mostly the result of a desire for reassurance. Psychologically, we want to believe that we are "right" and that means keeping that which we own.

At these prices though, I am looking to add to my CL holdings, not reduce them. I still believe this is a $100 stock in 24 months, unless equity valuations completely implode, which is possible, but then, it will simply mean that I will have a rising annuity with higher yields than most bonds and insurance products. Not too shabby. More on this in another post.

3. Management counts. The secret of Buffett's success has always been in his ability to recruit the right people. As a investor, he has sought in most cases to have them in situ. He does mention that he has developed a few of his best managers, though obviously they were already natural talents.

As a passive investor, I pay a huge amount of money to professional managers who run my businesses for me. How they do it is probably the single biggest determinant of success or failure. But here, I think point one still applies. Even great managers make mistakes. Ken Lewis is a natural deal-maker - it is how he built BoA into the powerhouse that it is. He made a mistake buying Merrill, and sadly, this was a mistake that was driven by ego.

Lewis always wanted to show the New York crowd that a hick from North Carolina was at least as good as they were. They always looked down on him for building a commercial and retail bank, since everyone in banking knows that the "big swinging dicks" of banking are all "investment" bankers. Acquiring Merrill was Lewis' way to do it. But Lewis' careful and steady build-up of a leading commercial/retail bank was stupendously profitable. Even the disaster with Countrywide was manageable given the strength of the cashflows from the retail network. It remains to be seen if a universal bank can truly be made to function - the economics and compensation may simply be too far apart. For the forseeable future, though, Lewis will be out of dealmaking and will instead have to focus on operations. Is he the right manager for that?

4. Panic and fear are my friends. In spite of my losses on a few securities, I managed to liquidate most of my holdings in April of 2007, when the Dow was at 12,500. I missed the October top, but I have not regretted sitting in cash, where my interest earned actually afforded my a mild gain in 2008. Now, I sit confidently and wait for values to keep coming my way, confident in the meantime that I can suffer no major permanent impairment to capital. Low interest rates now make solid dividend yielding stocks the ideal area to look, though this does expose one to at least temporary capital loss.

In January, I did reenter the market, buying HELE aggressively, only to suffer another loss. However, the stock trades at a clear discount to intrinsic value and I may very well purchase more soon. The problem is, there are even more attractive values now than there were in January.

So, while I believe that the economic bottom will be reached at the earliest sometime in 2010, I continue to watch for individual values, knowing that the market is likely to continue downward movement due to panic selling of index funds by retail investors. I look forward to having a chance to make some significant gains in the next few years.

Friday, January 09, 2009

A Bad Year. A New Year. Where do we go from here?

Well, I have continued to be relatively silent about the markets, because I believe that successful investing requires insight and I haven't had much until this past week.

First off, let me start by saying that I hope everyone had a relaxing holiday period. I have been on a nearly forced vacation for the past three weeks, but return to my "normal" life as a management consultant on Monday. My girlfriend already started working this week, which has given me a chance to really catch up on reading, particularly reading about the markets. It is a fun time to read, because everyone in the commentariat has an opinion (guilty as charged). So without further ado let us get started.

2008 Review

2008 will go down in history as one of the worst years in market history. Apart from the collapse of the NASDAQ in 2001, the (American) markets have not seen a year like this since the Hoover Administration. Emerging markets, extolled by the commentariat between 2004 and 2007 as "risk reduction" through greater diversification and protection against a weak dollar, turned out to have even worse years than the US, with the BRICs, (Brazil, Russia, India and China) all suffering massive declines - Russia dropped near 80% or so. Since the dollar has recovered, the losses, in dollar terms are worse still. Dollar terms matter, because most readers of this blog have their expenses and more importantly, their liabilities in US Dollars. In all, I have heard estimate of $30 trillion were lost. I cannot verify this number, but if 1000 points on the Dow is a good proxy for $1 trillion in market value, then the US is down $6 trillion since the October 2007 highs. [Note: found the source for the $30 trillion, Bennett Sedacca via John Mauldin]

The year has been particularly bad for banks and for those who work for them. Investment banking is all but dead; since there is no market for most corporate paper - whether debenture, asset-backed, convertible, preferred or common. There was exactly one flotation of high-yield paper in Q4 of 2008. Likewise, commercial lending is supine. Most small- and medium-sized firms are simply not creditworthy. Those that are are mostly looking to reduce the outstanding balances on their loans and credit lines. Sure, these have to be renegotiated on a regular basis (every 3-5 years normally) but the fees from this are tiny, and many firms are reducing the size of the lines to cut the fee expense.

Trading, which has been the lifeblood of many heretofore profitable financial institutions is a mixed bag. The incredible volatility in the markets means that there is real opportunity to make big money in trading (if you know what you are doing). On the other hand, most of the risk management strategies that had been used, swaps and other "exotic" derivatives, are now extremely expensive. But much of the leverage that made trading so profitable is being bled out of the system. Trades that make you a fraction of 1% per year aren't so attractive at 10x leverage as they are at 30x.

Asset management doesn't look good either. Many, many investors are discovering the pain of "relative performance" or "benchmark" performance. They are paying bonuses to managers who are "only" losing them 30% instead of 44%. And they are pulling their money out, becoming convinced that maybe buying and holding is not always the best strategy, except for asset managers for whom it generates nearly annuity-like management fees. Of course, even where investors are not pulling out their cash, the balances are declining, which means lower Assets-under-Management (AuM, in industry parlance). I have good friends in the Asset Management business, and I know they and their firms are struggling. Sure, the pure-play asset managers will still make money, but bonuses will be much smaller than expected and asset gathering will be difficult as long as investors fear losing money in the markets.

But the trouble didn't stop with banks, or stocks. Bonds (excepting sovereign debt) also performed miserably. Investors appetite for loaning money to anyone, reinforced by an investing environment where debt coverage ratios and debt equity ratios are moving in the wrong direction, saw flight from anything with default risk.

Even alternative asset classes are getting clobbered - this article notes that Venture Capital is basically dead, since the two most common exits - flotation and sale - are both crippled by a lack of buyers. Equity floatation is nearly impossible and without financial buyers in the mix and even most strategic buyers looking to improve the asset quality of their balance sheets, high prices that produce the 20%+ returns are hard to come by.

Hedge funds, particularly those based on "quantitative" strategies that make estimate of fair value of an asset based on the value of other assets - and of course, apply healthy leverage - have imploded left and right. And that was before Maddow's Ponti scheme emerged.

Elsewhere on main street, housing has continued to decline with the anticipated recovery date pushed back again and again. Now I increasingly see that my prediction of price declines into 2011 are becoming more accepted. The reason is based on two factors - 1) most real estate is purchased with debt and 2) people do not like to make leveraged purchases of assets declining in value. After all, as Lehman Brothers showed us, leverage cuts two ways and even small declines in the value of the asset can quickly wipe out the equity in a leveraged investment.

Thus, demand for such assets does not increase until buying becomes attractive compared to other alternatives - in housing this means - prices will only stop falling once it becomes far more attractive to own than to rent. So far, prices have fallen enough to restore the historical ratio of housing and rental prices, instead, owning has to offer a very attractive rental yield before there is a sufficient margin of safety for most investors/buyers to make such an investment.

Consumption is way down - whether on gasoline, consumer durables or even basics. The commentariat seems dismayed by the fact that even Wal*Mart, a discounter, had a bad Xmas season, suggesting that other retail chains will do far worse (how can SHLD still trade at 20x earnings then? True, it is trading at a discount to book and it does have lots of cash, but I think this is the Eddie Lampert premium. The margins and returns are awful and the core operating business is worthless). But I digress.

John Mauldin, whose columns have become a must read for over 1 million of his subscribers, notes that all of the economic indicators look bad. .

Personal performance 2008
There is a saying in German which goes says that anticipation in the best form of happiness and that schadenfreude is the most beautiful form of happiness. "Vorfreude ist die beste Freude, aber Schadenfreude ist die schönste Freude". It is funnier in German, because the words for anticipation and schadenfreude share the same root.

It was with more than a bit of schadenfreude (glee, one might say) that I was relating to a banker friend that my personal performance in 2008 was actually positive. There were only two places to be, actually, cash and sovereign debt. I can congratulate myself for having had the smarts to be in one of the two, but before I really count myself a genius, I must admit that I picked the inferior one. CASH has long been a favorite because I believed that asset prices were simply too high and that there was no reason to take any risk of capital loss while waiting for a good time to move my money back into cheaper assets.

However, a better strategy would have been to buy Treasuries, which have rallied, and on which I could have earned a nice capital gain. (An even better strategy would have been to short the market and use the proceeds to buy Treasuries, but ... hindsight is 20/20). However, at the time, I could not tell if deflation or inflation were likely to be the bigger problem. I certainly did not expect that the Federal Reserve would act to reduce long term rates so aggressively, and I did not want to take the interest rate risk associated with 10- or 30- year government paper.

So, it was nice to be up, if only fractionally. I earned over 2.5% on my holdings of (now FDIC insured!) money markets and managed not to lose too much on my few equity positions. I outperformed the market by over 40% with less risk! Talk about generating alpha!

I must admit that my equity positions were hardly winners. Both of my big losers were stocks I purchased and held in part as hedges against my cash position. My own view was that the markets would tank. But in the event that I was seriously overreading events, I decided that I would hold some investments that would perform well in a mild recession/strong recovery environment backstopped by, in the first case, a strong operating business nad in the second, by a strong investment portfolio worth more than the company itself.

First, I badly stumbled with Bank of America. I have been savoring the massive yield for the past several years. I rationalized holding it by looking at relative performance, rather than at the facts on the ground. To date, the company has not had a loss making quarter, even when it has taken huge write downs. But the truth is, deciphering the balance sheet of any financial institution today is a lot of guesswork. As such, earnings estimates are really more estimated than usual. So, rather than sell at $52 in August of 2007 when I seriously thought about it, I still hold it at $14.

My other mistake was of a similar mold, BSET. This is a struggling furniture maker (that's a redundancy, right?) whose strength is mostly that they have a massive investment portfolio that they can use to ride out the downturn. The stock, now trading at $3, trades for much less than the value of this investment portfolio. At the time, the company appeared to be looking to undertake several investor-friendly steps to return cash in the form of a special dividend and buybacks. They are also in the process of overhauling their retail network with a new concept that has shown significant progress, or was showing it before the fourth quarter.

The company may very well survive the downturn. It has an established brand name, knows its customer base, has developed an attractive "mass-customization" design studio (pick your style, pick your size, pick your fabrics) as a retail concept and has cut expenses, if not ruthlessly. It also has ample financing from its still large investment portfolio and its share of profits from a major real estate investment. The company trades at a significant discount to assets. Further, assets are understated, because the company carries the value of its real estate holdings as a net liability, because of dividends in excess of profits from the real estate partnership.

But the company competes in an extremely difficult segment - consumer durables - where spending is largely discretionary and strapped consumers are simply not doing major remodelling, so the core business is likely to struggle for some time yet. And there are the contingent liabilities for the retail rentals for its franchisees.

I should consider selling both of these investments - but I believe the prospects for both are not that bad. BAC is consolidating the industry. Much will depend on how effectively it integrates the Merrill Lynch asset management business with the retail banking where it is already dominant. BSET would be worth much more than $3 per share if it were simply to exit the furniture business, except that it cannot do so, because of the status of its franchisees.

I brighter (or perhaps less dim) spot was CL. Colgate is still my favorite stock purchase ever. This company, though it trades at 10x book, is still a value. Dividends can be increases by 8-12% practically forever. Indeed, with a dividend of 40 cents per quarter and earnings of $1 per quarter, the company would still earn its dividend a decade from now while hiking payouts 10% each year, even if earnings growth were zero. Since it also buys back stock regularly and has seen growth in most markets, including growth in share, while being able to raise prices, earnings will likely continue to grow by about 8% per share nearly indefinately, supporting dividend increases of 10% or more, also indefinately. If the yield on the stock remains constant at 2.5% and the dividend increases 10% per year, this is a near "risk-free" 12.5% return. It amazes me that the stock is not at $100, but I believe it will be there before the end of 2010.

Conclusions and outlook

First, 2008 has taught us that fundamentals matter. Diversifying is simply not an adequate risk management strategy, because in major crisis periods, all markets tend to move together - down. And the possibility of suffering major and permanent loss of capital is large.

Second, relative performance can kill you. If the first rule of investing is "don't lose money" and the second rule, is "don't forget rule number 1" then investors must think in terms of absolute returns. This means, unfortunately, that some years, we may "underperform" incredibly frothy speculative markets. But the old saw about the correlation of risk and return, usually used to encourage risk-averse investors to move further out the risk curve, must be inverted. Taking more risk can kill you - and systemmic risk in particular - can wipe out a portfolio. Every risk, every position, needs to be constantly evaluated to determine if the upside is adequately backstopped by a margin of safety.

Third, markets have done a poor job of "pricing-in" events. As early as February 2007 it was clear that the financial markets were going to have problems. I exited the markets largely later that spring. Even after the extreme stress of August 2007, the markets made new highs in October! Earnings estimates continue to decline for the S&P500 for 2009, although, most people are still believing that things will improve in about six months. This has been the argument since 2007! The nice thing about this is that it means that we can profit from these "inefficiencies".

Fourth, markets do not always go "up". Japan made new post-bubble lows this year. Stock prices in Japan have returned to levels not seen since the early 1980s. Read this carefully. We are talking about having no capital gains in over 25 years. Investors who purchased the index in the 2nd half of that decade are still underwater, by as much as 80%. Of course, investment yields in Japan are so strong, who needs capital gains .... oh, wait.

The long and short is that we are in an incredible investing environment in which fortunes can be made and lost. Decisions will have long lasting and incredible impact. In part two, I will discuss the outlook for 2009.

Thursday, December 04, 2008

Blodget says bubbles are rational


Henry Blodgett, a man whose greatest accomplishment was making a trend call on Amazon in 1998, has done it again. He substitutes narrative for analysis and now explains to us that the bubble was rational.

After constructing a list of possible culprits for bubble-mania (a list which includes mortgage brokers, real estate agents, Wall Street bankers, the SEC, and Alan Greenspan), he then lays the blame on the public - in his word "us". He excuses all of his straw-men with the following:
Everyone else on that list above bears some responsibility too. But in the case
I have described, it would be hard to say that any of them acted criminally. Or
irrationally. Or even irresponsibly. In fact, almost everyone on that list acted
just the way you would expect them to act under the circumstances.
He argues that every individual participant in the market had a specific aim, and that participating was a means to that end (and was therefore rational). He points out that buyers wanted houses (though in many cases so they could sell them to some other fool who would pay even more), agents wanted commissions, brokers wanted fees, and so on and so on. Playing the game was "rational" - and only the buyer had a real interest in predicting the future of the housing market (since he was the one who would have to pay for the asset, albeit over 30 years).

But what he overlooks, largely because his article is an act of narrative, not one of analysis, is the investor PURCHASING the loan in the form of a bond. What was irrational, ultimately, was that Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) would always offer the same default risk as a government bond for substantially higher yield. This was idiotic. The price of the asset against which the security was secured (the house) in relation to the intrinsic value of the asset (the potential rental income of ownership) was already becoming strained in 2003-2004 in most markets. To believe that liquidation at anything approaching par would be possible, or that borrowers would really follow historical trends when it was obvious that an orgy of buying was pushing prices higher, was simply not rational.

True, the rating agencies wanted to rate bonds (because they wanted fees), but relying on the recommendation of a third party to do your homework for you - for free - now that is what I call irrational.