Showing posts with label Markets and Outlook. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Markets and Outlook. Show all posts

Friday, March 11, 2011

Why this market is stalling out

So, many stories this week have highlighted that we are at the 2 year mark of an incredible bull run for US equities.  Mind you, at time of this writing, the Dow recrossed the 12,000 mark, which it lost yesterday, leaving it up about 3 percent from the Jan 2000 high of 11722, which, to my mind, still marks the top of the bull market.

For eleven years now, we have essentially gone nowhere - except to get some dividends.

Of course, if you traded in this market, or kept buying through the 2000-2002 crash, and then sold in 2007 or 2008, you did pretty well (provided you weren't heavily invested in Qualcomm or Nortel in 1999).

But where do we go from here?  Indications on several stocks are saying - earnings are strong, the bull should continue.  Other people, like Charles Nenner, believe things are heading back down from here.  I have believed in a double dip in equity prices, because lots of fundamental research I have read suggest that bull markets begin when valuations, as measured by P/Es, are below 10.  We are definately not there today, which means that we have another leg to go before we can build another bull market.  It is possible that this won't be as sharp as the 2008-2009 crash.  It might not be as deep, either, since P/E can fall if prices decline modestly and earnings increase.  This would be much like the late 1970s, when, earnings growth was rapid (becuase of inflation) but multiples contracted (because investors demanded a short payback period on investments to compensate them for inflation).

Friday, March 04, 2011

Employment Report Looking Positive

So, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released its monthly reports of employment and both were positive. As expected, payrolls increased by about 200k in February, along with substantial upward revisions to January and December, indicating that corporate payrolls are expanding.

December 2010 was originally reported at 103k, then revised upward to 121k in the Feb report was revised again to 152k. Jan 2011 was also revised up from a disappointing 36k to 63k, I expect a number closer to 100k come April.

It suggests that the unemployment rate, (from the household survey, a different measure), which continues to decline is not just a statistical quirk, but is indicative of real job market experience.

The unemployment rate, which has dropped from 9.8 percent in November is not only dropping because more people are working, however. It is also due to the fact that the participation rate (the percentage of adults who are part of the labor force) is declining. I expect this trend to continue, as large numbers of Boomers retire and leave the workforce permanently. This phenomenon has implications for economic growth and taxes, many of which are not necessarily positive, but the good news for job seekers is that fewer adults are trying to hold a job, which should mean more opportunity for those who have jobs and are looking for them.

It may mean that the job creation rate necessary for absorbtion is lower than anticipated. It is estimated that the US has to generate between 125k and 150k jobs per month to accomodate new net labor force entrants, which the economy is now doing. However, this number has not changed since the 2000-2002 recession, whereas the net new market entrants may in fact be much lower going forward.

CNBC is suggesting that unemployment will now stay below 10%, and I believe this is correct. Unemployment will likely continue to drift lower, slowly perhaps, but another 0.5% to 1.0% by the end of the year is conceivable, with further improvement in 2012.

What will impede rapid decline will be the large number of discouraged workers who are no part of the labor force returning to the job market as they perceive better employment prospects.

Nevertheless, the numbers were quite encouragining - private sector employment was up over 220k, while state and local government cut employment. Counting the upward revisions in the earlier months, private sector employment expanded by nearly 300k. This will have positive impact for government budgets as well, as taxes increase and costs decline.

The stock market, after an initial positive response, turned around and was down on the news. Though this follows a big surge on Thursday, when rumors of a +250k number were circulating.

The markets may have also woken up two other facts: first, that productivity gains, which have been astonishing (and helpful of corporate profits) are likely going to moderate - after all, new hiring is what happens when the existing labor force cannot meet the demands for output, and second, that it is only a matter of time before the Fed begins to withdraw its exceptional monetary support.

I am hopeful that awareness of these two facts will drive the market lower and provide attractive long term valuations.

Thursday, December 30, 2010

Has the Stock Market Gotten Riskier? - Investing - Stocks - SmartMoney.com

Why are retail investors leaving equities amid strong returns and strong corporate profitability? 

This is a terrific article about the reasons that the stock market should be stalling.  In short, the market has become more volatile, which, in portfolio theory, means that it involves more risk and therefore require a higher risk premium.

The article suggests that valuation shouldn’t be the source of the problem, given that investors were willing to pay more in 2007 for assets that had a lower earnings yield.

Instead, it suggests that the sharp increase in the number of large movement days, up or down, that have occurred in the last 25, 15 and 10 years (2/3rds of extreme price movements since 1950 have been crammed into the last 15 years), has changed investors perspective on the “riskiness” of the market.

Portfolio theory says that assets are priced relative to each other, and that an investor begins with a “Risk-free” rate, one where the exact prices and returns are calculable with 100% knowledge, e.g. a Treasury bill.  Riskier assets should require a higher risk premium to compensate the investor for taking on the additional risk.

Risk is considered to be the volatility around an expected return.  If a Risk Free investment guarantees me 2% (no volatility – I will get my expected return, because the US government WILL make the payments it has promised, when it has promised them), then to hold a riskier asset, one where I could lose money (one possible return outcome is negative) I must be able to have a reasonable expectation of finishing well above 2%.  How much exactly is known as the “risk premium”.

Stock prices have risen as the risk free rate has collapsed to near zero – increasing the premium offered by risk assets.  (The risk premium is calculated by taking the expected return of the risk assets minus the risk free rate,  E(r)[Risk Asset] – R(f) rate.  If E(r) remains constant and R(f) gets smaller the spread will increase).

If the original premium is correct, then prices of the risky asset should rise reducing expected returns on the risky asset to the point where expected returns maintain the same risk premium. 

However, if volatility in stock prices rises, the greater risk suggests that the equity risk premium should rise, and therefore, lowering the risk free rate will not raise equity prices as much as would be expected.  In fact, if the risk free rate is perceived to be heavily manipulated, such as by extensive central bank intervention (QE2, anyone), then it may not be perceived as the true “risk free” rate.

The article suggests that retail stock investors may be catching on to this, since, in spite of the strong equity returns since March 2009, investors have yanked over $100 bn out of equity mutual funds (that has to putting hurt into someone’s management fees … wealth managers be warned).  The article notes, rightly that dividend yields (which reduce the volatility of returns by adding a regular payment that is not subject to market pricing) have collapsed from 5% to 2% over the same time period (that is, since 1950).

I think the writer underestimates the significance of the lowered expectations of returns.  For years, investors were fed a steady diet of the idea that 1) equity premia were too high, 2) that the stock market experienced a geometric growth average of around 10% – at least since 1926, and 3) that over the “long term”, the market goes up.  Thus, what financial “professionals” were selling to retail investors was something like a turbo-charged savings account.  In exchange for “temporary” losses, an investor – really a saver – could earn a high return on their savings.  Wealth building 11% returns were to be expected.

Of course, it hasn’t turned out that way.  Geometric returns since 1926 have fallen, as stocks have moved sideways for 10 years, earning only the dividend yield.  Americans shouldn’t feel too bad – if you invested in Japanese equities anytime since the early 1980s and have held, you have experienced negative returns, money invested in 1989 is still underwater by 70%.

But here is the thing – portfolio theory says that given a specific level of volatility an appropriate risk premium can be determined.  I think that the risk premium is also a factor of expected returns.  11% returns, when compounded over decades, produce very positive financial outcomes.  Lower that amount, to 8% or in my opinion a more realistic 6%, and all of a sudden, dreams of big houses, vacation homes and a boat begin to look less like sure things, and purchasing equities with savings begins to look like a risky way to pay for healthcare and food in retirement – you know, the stuff our parents and grandparents purchase.

Suddenly, the stock market doesn’t look like the best place to put one’s savings.  And so, the retail investor wants to put more money into lower volatility assets, to be sure to have something left with which to purchase necessities.  It may require increasing the amount one saves from earnings dramatically.

The article’s author does suggest a good additional approach – create an asset of your own by starting a business.  As he notes, most of the inputs are inexpensive right now, and with few attractive options to invest your money in portfolio assets, a business may be the best wealth builder yet.

Here is the link.

Has the Stock Market Gotten Riskier? - Investing - Stocks - SmartMoney.com

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Billionaires with Bad Advice (pt 1)

When someone makes it on the Forbes Billionaires list, people tend to take his or her thoughts on business seriously. This is even more the case when that same person became rich by owning a money management firm. Indeed, Forbes takes Kenneth Fisher’s view of the markets so seriously that it has made him its longest running columnist and commentator in its history. Forbes and certainly its readers should rethink the confidence they have placed in him.

Fisher’s latest commentary contains statements that are patently untrue and are likely to mislead investors in ways that will be quite damaging to their portfolios, so I have to respond.

Fisher regularly offers a free commentary to the investing public (“A suprising prediction by Kenneth Fisher”) which is used as a marketing tool for his asset management firm. (It is offered at no cost for answering a short questionnaire about how much money you have and how much 3rd party management interests you). His latest commentary attempts to explain why an investor who has his money with Fisher’s firm should continue to keep it there and fully invested, in spite of the dramatic losses such an investor has sustained following Fisher’s advice. He resorts to two basic claims arguing for remaining fully invested. One is simply false the other is questionable.

The first is a claim about how markets recover. The information implies that markets always recover over a reasonable amount of time and that the long term trend of the market is up. This is simply not true, as anyone who invested in Japan in 1989 can tell you. After the 1929 US market crash, the market took 25 years to regain its high, but at least it spent most of that stretch of 25 years well above the lows it made in 1932. What Japan suggests is that following a massive credit bubble, asset prices can keep falling indefinitely. 20 years after the Nikkei index peak, the market is still making new lows (prices are back to the same levels they were over 25 years ago). In fairness, the US has a few fundamental advantages that suggest that a true Japan scenario is unlikely. On the other hand, the US is also confronted with challenges Japanese firms did not have to deal with: Japan’s struggles to maintain output happened against a backdrop of robust global growth which supported profitable exports.

The key takeaway for the prudent investor is that counting on rising markets is dangerous. Big falls in asset prices do not guarantee that investments will produce satisfactory returns going forward. Lower prices do suggest higher earnings yields, provided that earnings mean-revert. Keynes had it right. “’We simply do not know” if earnings will return to previous trend growth. In Japan, they did not, which is why the market continues to languish more than 80% below its highs. Investors must be wary and continue to be selective in their investment choices as permanent loss of capital is still possible. The focus must be on “return of capital” more than on “return on capital”. They should keep a bias for “cash on the table” in the form of steady, well-protected dividends from firms that have non-cyclical earnings streams, coupled with solid balance sheets that could be financed from operating cash flow.

Friday, January 09, 2009

A Bad Year. A New Year. Where do we go from here?

Well, I have continued to be relatively silent about the markets, because I believe that successful investing requires insight and I haven't had much until this past week.

First off, let me start by saying that I hope everyone had a relaxing holiday period. I have been on a nearly forced vacation for the past three weeks, but return to my "normal" life as a management consultant on Monday. My girlfriend already started working this week, which has given me a chance to really catch up on reading, particularly reading about the markets. It is a fun time to read, because everyone in the commentariat has an opinion (guilty as charged). So without further ado let us get started.

2008 Review

2008 will go down in history as one of the worst years in market history. Apart from the collapse of the NASDAQ in 2001, the (American) markets have not seen a year like this since the Hoover Administration. Emerging markets, extolled by the commentariat between 2004 and 2007 as "risk reduction" through greater diversification and protection against a weak dollar, turned out to have even worse years than the US, with the BRICs, (Brazil, Russia, India and China) all suffering massive declines - Russia dropped near 80% or so. Since the dollar has recovered, the losses, in dollar terms are worse still. Dollar terms matter, because most readers of this blog have their expenses and more importantly, their liabilities in US Dollars. In all, I have heard estimate of $30 trillion were lost. I cannot verify this number, but if 1000 points on the Dow is a good proxy for $1 trillion in market value, then the US is down $6 trillion since the October 2007 highs. [Note: found the source for the $30 trillion, Bennett Sedacca via John Mauldin]

The year has been particularly bad for banks and for those who work for them. Investment banking is all but dead; since there is no market for most corporate paper - whether debenture, asset-backed, convertible, preferred or common. There was exactly one flotation of high-yield paper in Q4 of 2008. Likewise, commercial lending is supine. Most small- and medium-sized firms are simply not creditworthy. Those that are are mostly looking to reduce the outstanding balances on their loans and credit lines. Sure, these have to be renegotiated on a regular basis (every 3-5 years normally) but the fees from this are tiny, and many firms are reducing the size of the lines to cut the fee expense.

Trading, which has been the lifeblood of many heretofore profitable financial institutions is a mixed bag. The incredible volatility in the markets means that there is real opportunity to make big money in trading (if you know what you are doing). On the other hand, most of the risk management strategies that had been used, swaps and other "exotic" derivatives, are now extremely expensive. But much of the leverage that made trading so profitable is being bled out of the system. Trades that make you a fraction of 1% per year aren't so attractive at 10x leverage as they are at 30x.

Asset management doesn't look good either. Many, many investors are discovering the pain of "relative performance" or "benchmark" performance. They are paying bonuses to managers who are "only" losing them 30% instead of 44%. And they are pulling their money out, becoming convinced that maybe buying and holding is not always the best strategy, except for asset managers for whom it generates nearly annuity-like management fees. Of course, even where investors are not pulling out their cash, the balances are declining, which means lower Assets-under-Management (AuM, in industry parlance). I have good friends in the Asset Management business, and I know they and their firms are struggling. Sure, the pure-play asset managers will still make money, but bonuses will be much smaller than expected and asset gathering will be difficult as long as investors fear losing money in the markets.

But the trouble didn't stop with banks, or stocks. Bonds (excepting sovereign debt) also performed miserably. Investors appetite for loaning money to anyone, reinforced by an investing environment where debt coverage ratios and debt equity ratios are moving in the wrong direction, saw flight from anything with default risk.

Even alternative asset classes are getting clobbered - this article notes that Venture Capital is basically dead, since the two most common exits - flotation and sale - are both crippled by a lack of buyers. Equity floatation is nearly impossible and without financial buyers in the mix and even most strategic buyers looking to improve the asset quality of their balance sheets, high prices that produce the 20%+ returns are hard to come by.

Hedge funds, particularly those based on "quantitative" strategies that make estimate of fair value of an asset based on the value of other assets - and of course, apply healthy leverage - have imploded left and right. And that was before Maddow's Ponti scheme emerged.

Elsewhere on main street, housing has continued to decline with the anticipated recovery date pushed back again and again. Now I increasingly see that my prediction of price declines into 2011 are becoming more accepted. The reason is based on two factors - 1) most real estate is purchased with debt and 2) people do not like to make leveraged purchases of assets declining in value. After all, as Lehman Brothers showed us, leverage cuts two ways and even small declines in the value of the asset can quickly wipe out the equity in a leveraged investment.

Thus, demand for such assets does not increase until buying becomes attractive compared to other alternatives - in housing this means - prices will only stop falling once it becomes far more attractive to own than to rent. So far, prices have fallen enough to restore the historical ratio of housing and rental prices, instead, owning has to offer a very attractive rental yield before there is a sufficient margin of safety for most investors/buyers to make such an investment.

Consumption is way down - whether on gasoline, consumer durables or even basics. The commentariat seems dismayed by the fact that even Wal*Mart, a discounter, had a bad Xmas season, suggesting that other retail chains will do far worse (how can SHLD still trade at 20x earnings then? True, it is trading at a discount to book and it does have lots of cash, but I think this is the Eddie Lampert premium. The margins and returns are awful and the core operating business is worthless). But I digress.

John Mauldin, whose columns have become a must read for over 1 million of his subscribers, notes that all of the economic indicators look bad. .

Personal performance 2008
There is a saying in German which goes says that anticipation in the best form of happiness and that schadenfreude is the most beautiful form of happiness. "Vorfreude ist die beste Freude, aber Schadenfreude ist die schönste Freude". It is funnier in German, because the words for anticipation and schadenfreude share the same root.

It was with more than a bit of schadenfreude (glee, one might say) that I was relating to a banker friend that my personal performance in 2008 was actually positive. There were only two places to be, actually, cash and sovereign debt. I can congratulate myself for having had the smarts to be in one of the two, but before I really count myself a genius, I must admit that I picked the inferior one. CASH has long been a favorite because I believed that asset prices were simply too high and that there was no reason to take any risk of capital loss while waiting for a good time to move my money back into cheaper assets.

However, a better strategy would have been to buy Treasuries, which have rallied, and on which I could have earned a nice capital gain. (An even better strategy would have been to short the market and use the proceeds to buy Treasuries, but ... hindsight is 20/20). However, at the time, I could not tell if deflation or inflation were likely to be the bigger problem. I certainly did not expect that the Federal Reserve would act to reduce long term rates so aggressively, and I did not want to take the interest rate risk associated with 10- or 30- year government paper.

So, it was nice to be up, if only fractionally. I earned over 2.5% on my holdings of (now FDIC insured!) money markets and managed not to lose too much on my few equity positions. I outperformed the market by over 40% with less risk! Talk about generating alpha!

I must admit that my equity positions were hardly winners. Both of my big losers were stocks I purchased and held in part as hedges against my cash position. My own view was that the markets would tank. But in the event that I was seriously overreading events, I decided that I would hold some investments that would perform well in a mild recession/strong recovery environment backstopped by, in the first case, a strong operating business nad in the second, by a strong investment portfolio worth more than the company itself.

First, I badly stumbled with Bank of America. I have been savoring the massive yield for the past several years. I rationalized holding it by looking at relative performance, rather than at the facts on the ground. To date, the company has not had a loss making quarter, even when it has taken huge write downs. But the truth is, deciphering the balance sheet of any financial institution today is a lot of guesswork. As such, earnings estimates are really more estimated than usual. So, rather than sell at $52 in August of 2007 when I seriously thought about it, I still hold it at $14.

My other mistake was of a similar mold, BSET. This is a struggling furniture maker (that's a redundancy, right?) whose strength is mostly that they have a massive investment portfolio that they can use to ride out the downturn. The stock, now trading at $3, trades for much less than the value of this investment portfolio. At the time, the company appeared to be looking to undertake several investor-friendly steps to return cash in the form of a special dividend and buybacks. They are also in the process of overhauling their retail network with a new concept that has shown significant progress, or was showing it before the fourth quarter.

The company may very well survive the downturn. It has an established brand name, knows its customer base, has developed an attractive "mass-customization" design studio (pick your style, pick your size, pick your fabrics) as a retail concept and has cut expenses, if not ruthlessly. It also has ample financing from its still large investment portfolio and its share of profits from a major real estate investment. The company trades at a significant discount to assets. Further, assets are understated, because the company carries the value of its real estate holdings as a net liability, because of dividends in excess of profits from the real estate partnership.

But the company competes in an extremely difficult segment - consumer durables - where spending is largely discretionary and strapped consumers are simply not doing major remodelling, so the core business is likely to struggle for some time yet. And there are the contingent liabilities for the retail rentals for its franchisees.

I should consider selling both of these investments - but I believe the prospects for both are not that bad. BAC is consolidating the industry. Much will depend on how effectively it integrates the Merrill Lynch asset management business with the retail banking where it is already dominant. BSET would be worth much more than $3 per share if it were simply to exit the furniture business, except that it cannot do so, because of the status of its franchisees.

I brighter (or perhaps less dim) spot was CL. Colgate is still my favorite stock purchase ever. This company, though it trades at 10x book, is still a value. Dividends can be increases by 8-12% practically forever. Indeed, with a dividend of 40 cents per quarter and earnings of $1 per quarter, the company would still earn its dividend a decade from now while hiking payouts 10% each year, even if earnings growth were zero. Since it also buys back stock regularly and has seen growth in most markets, including growth in share, while being able to raise prices, earnings will likely continue to grow by about 8% per share nearly indefinately, supporting dividend increases of 10% or more, also indefinately. If the yield on the stock remains constant at 2.5% and the dividend increases 10% per year, this is a near "risk-free" 12.5% return. It amazes me that the stock is not at $100, but I believe it will be there before the end of 2010.

Conclusions and outlook

First, 2008 has taught us that fundamentals matter. Diversifying is simply not an adequate risk management strategy, because in major crisis periods, all markets tend to move together - down. And the possibility of suffering major and permanent loss of capital is large.

Second, relative performance can kill you. If the first rule of investing is "don't lose money" and the second rule, is "don't forget rule number 1" then investors must think in terms of absolute returns. This means, unfortunately, that some years, we may "underperform" incredibly frothy speculative markets. But the old saw about the correlation of risk and return, usually used to encourage risk-averse investors to move further out the risk curve, must be inverted. Taking more risk can kill you - and systemmic risk in particular - can wipe out a portfolio. Every risk, every position, needs to be constantly evaluated to determine if the upside is adequately backstopped by a margin of safety.

Third, markets have done a poor job of "pricing-in" events. As early as February 2007 it was clear that the financial markets were going to have problems. I exited the markets largely later that spring. Even after the extreme stress of August 2007, the markets made new highs in October! Earnings estimates continue to decline for the S&P500 for 2009, although, most people are still believing that things will improve in about six months. This has been the argument since 2007! The nice thing about this is that it means that we can profit from these "inefficiencies".

Fourth, markets do not always go "up". Japan made new post-bubble lows this year. Stock prices in Japan have returned to levels not seen since the early 1980s. Read this carefully. We are talking about having no capital gains in over 25 years. Investors who purchased the index in the 2nd half of that decade are still underwater, by as much as 80%. Of course, investment yields in Japan are so strong, who needs capital gains .... oh, wait.

The long and short is that we are in an incredible investing environment in which fortunes can be made and lost. Decisions will have long lasting and incredible impact. In part two, I will discuss the outlook for 2009.

Wednesday, April 09, 2008

The End of the Euro?

Jim from The Depression of 2006 has started a very interesting conversation on the return of the Deutsche Mark. I have been arguing that the Euro is here to stay and that it has benefitted Europe in many ways, not least, through higher efficiency and by making cross border consolidation of industries easier, since currency arbitrage is no longer necessary, at least within Europe.

But this article is another piece of "evidence" that there is dissastifaction with the project. So I wanted to address it.

Jim and others have taken the view that the Euro is a real drag on competitiveness, particularly for Germany, a country that is heavily dependendent on exports. Germans often complain about prices under the Euro, calling it der Teuro, which is a pun on the German word for expensive, which is teuer (pronouced toi´-er). The German pronunciation of Euro is Oi´-ro, so it rhymes.

I countered that the actual influence of the higher Euro on finished goods prices was not that large, because a stronger Euro was making raw materials relatively less expensive. Raw materials are a major factor in the price of automobiles and other high-end export products. The higher Euro primarily creates a price disadvantage in labor costs - this is not nothing, but a 50% increase in the value of the Euro does not translate into a 50% cost change, more like 15-20%.

This, of course, is still an issue, but there are other positives that offset some of this decline. First, Europeans are experiencing higher purchasing power - energy costs, food costs and other basic materials, not to mention imports of equipment like computers and software from the US have become less expensive. The higher purchasing power allows Europeans to increase aggregate consumption, meaning that more economic growth can be driven by the home market. Overall, I argue (and most economists and business leaders would agree) that the Euro has been a net positive.

Politics, of course, is something else. Focused on Germany, I largely neglected the other side of the coin - the Mediterranean economies, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece. An article in Forbes argues that they desire to pull out of the Euro, because they are prevented from using their traditional strategy for restoring economic balance: currency devaluation.

Andre Sapir, a major insider at the EU, has published a paper on the European Social Models, which argues that there are really four different economic models offered in Europe. Each model offers certain strengths and weaknesses, though some more strengths and some more weaknesses. A key factor is that the Mediterraneans have traditionally resorted to devaluation to escape structural problems in their economies, such as demands for high wages from relatively unproductive union workers. Because it enforces a consistent monetary policy (and one that reflects the desires of the "Continentals" - Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg as well as Austria and France) it essentially runs counter to the political situation in Spain, Italy and Greece, and that they may chose to leave. (Note that the Nordics and Anglo-Saxons largely avoided joining the Euro altogether).

The argument in Forbes essentially says that if they were to leave (certainly if France were to pull out) the Euro as a currency would collapse, and Jim would be right, we would have a new Deutsche Mark. (Though, were this to happen, I believe the Germans would still engage in policies such as fiscal displine an a positive balance of payments that would ensure the Mark would be strong, not weak).

I still think this outcome unlikely, in spite of the glacial progress of European integration. More and more, that integration is leading to substantial gains. Moreover, many of the countries, particularly Germany and Austria and to a much lesser extent France, have made real strides in improving the productivity of their economies. A collapse of the Euro would invite many other changes which are generally well received in Europe. It would ask whether the common market should really be maintained, or whether the Schengen system (which allows for free movement of people, i.e. the ability to work outside of one's home country) should be continued and on what scale. All of which would lead to reduced, not enhanced, opportunity for Europeans.

Economic nationalism is rearing its ugly head in many places, the US presidential election, particularly in places like Pennsylvania, which has seen a decline in manufacturing employment (much of which has moved South, not offshore, or simply been automated out of existence).

Globalization is not an inexorable trend. Largely global markets in the late 19th century, which coincided with massive gains in labor productivity and also purchasing power, were undone in the period 1915-1935, especially 1930-1935, when international trade declined by over 30%. The outcome was predictable. With the loss of global markets, local surpluses of goods, services and commodities could not reach needed customers and prices, employment and investment fell precipitiously. At the same time, consumers could no longer tap global sources of supply, so local shortages resulted in higher prices and lower consumption.

I remain optimistic that Europeans will keep the Euro. I find it much better than changing currencies all the time (how many Austrian shillings to the dollar again?) and it creates a sense of a broader European market, rather than a series of small national ones - a sense which is slowly becoming a reality. I am even getting used to the 1 and 2 Euro coins, though, as an American, I still believe change should be for amounts smaller than a basic currency unit.

The article has some advice on what to do if you want to speculate on a disintegration of the Eurozone. I have no better suggestions, but I will point out that the devaluation that is anticipated would be bad for commodity prices (in US dollar terms). But it is a bit early to go short on commodities over anticipation of the demise of the Euro.

Tuesday, April 01, 2008

Housing Analysis: You read it here first

I relgiously read two of John Mauldin's weekly newsletters, Thoughts from the Frontline and the Outside the Box E-Letter. Last Friday, in FrontLine, he mentioned two deep analyses of the housing market, both Powerpoint™ presentations. Based on his recommendation I read them both. One slide, from John Burns Real Estate Consulting made me particularly proud, because of this chart:

A few weeks ago, in my own reading of the housing tea leaves I produced and published this chart:


When I published this analysis, readers of this blog were quick to comment on my view that it is necessary to see a significant overshoot to the downside in order to offset the long and excessive overshoot to the upside. This follows from the very definition of a trend line. A trend line is defined using a statistical process known as ordinary least squares (OLS). What this does is draw a line through the data set such that minimizes the total distance between the square of the actual data (the Y-value) and the trend line, for every X-value in the data set. Squares are used to eliminate negative values. In other words, we try to find the line that has the least “error” – that one which does the best job of estimating what the Y -should be for any X-value.

In a good data series with a strong trend, we can often “free-hand draw” a trend line through a data series because visually we see that the line must be roughly “in the middle” that is – that error of underestimation (where the actual data is above the trend line) must roughly equal the amount of overestimation (where the actual data fall below the trend line). That is, the point at which there is the least “error” in estimation.

Drawing a trend line through a data set is easy (actually, we can draw multiple trend “lines” as many trends are better described by curves, such as compound interest projections). The question is – does the trend line matter: that is, is the relationship a significant one.

In the case of home sales and their growth over time, the answer is yes. Home sales volume, over the long term, is driven by household formation which itself is remarkably stable, though it certainly has gone through periods of faster and slower expansion, thus residential real estate sales growth over time is remarkably stable (note that the growth rate is the slope of the trend line). Home sales growth is a geometric series with respect to time, however, so there should be a curve sloping upwards, the problem is, the growth rate itself is so small (At less than 1% per year) that even over long periods of time the series may appear to be linear.

Nevertheless, not to get carried away, what is important to realize is in order for housing to bottom, sales must remain below trend for some time. This is not what policymakers are suggesting. Rather, they are trying to find ways to support bubble-era prices in a post-bubble environment.

One suggestion has been for the Federal Government to purchase and demolish undesired homes so as to reduce inventory. Incidentally, this policy is not without precedent in major cities that have fallen on hard times. Philly and Buffalo both have crews who perform demolitions, though sadly, there are so many homes that the crews have multi-year backlogs.

While I think this to be a good idea in cities that clearly have far too many homes to support the population that actually wants to live there, I think it should be done at the local level, since it was local planning boards who approved the building of the homes in the first place. Local taxpayers will suffer the demolition costs, but they are also the ones who will benefit from the presumably higher prices that derive from having fewer homes for sale (and fewer abandoned homes in the neighbourhood). I see no reason to make residents of Omaha pay for demolition to support home prices in Las Vegas.

But attempts to manage inventory is trying to fix the wrong problem. The issue with sales (and ultimately prices) is that there are relatively few buyers. Very few people have anything like an incentive to purchase a home, given that buying a home represents a huge premium to renting. Moreover, very few people can come up with a substantial down payment required to purchase a home in the absence of home price appreciation. But reducing inventory will likely make the problem worse.

Reducing inventory is an attempt to maintain artificially high prices – but who would or could pay those prices? Even the people who “purchased” the homes, using questionable financing let us not forget, could not afford those homes. At best we will exacerbate the problem of poor affordability at worst we could reignite bubble lending and more building.

Do you see, as our politicians do not, that keeping prices high means that the only option for purchasing is to continue to rely on low-down payment financing and hope for future appreciation (i.e. bubble thinking)? The higher prices remain, the larger the down payment required to obtain a conventional mortgage. Why do we want to make it harder for people to purchase a home?

The best option is to see a reduction in prices. Only a revaluation of owned real estate with respect to rented real estate can encourage buyers to make the switch from renting to owning or to purchase an additional property with the intent of renting it. This could, begin to help us lift that trend line.

Conclusion

Housing sales will be down for years. The fundamentals are against home purchase, though there is some potential in trade up now, if you can sell your own home. First time buyers are still priced out of the market and will be discouraged by falling prices to risk hard-saved equity. Moreover, lenders will be insistent on having lower LTV so as to ensure adequate protection for their own loans. The lack of buyers cannot be materially improved by policy moves, though it can be materially impaired by them.

I also recommend that you sign up for John Mauldin’s newsletters here and that you read the presentations here and here.

Just remember, you read it at the Strategic Investor first.

Monday, March 17, 2008

What I was trying to say

In my last post was that the meltdown of Bear Stearns threatens the entire financial system. This was the reason that the Fed had to intervene to arrange the sale of Bear.

The reason that any element can bring down the system now is the interdependence of the players. The rise of structured finance, which enables risk to be sliced into various pieces and traded between banks, funds, insurance firms, investors, the government, corporations, farmers, travellers - in short, everyone - means that the failure of any large player inevitably weakens everyone else.

Derivatives essentially function like insurance - enabling the buyer to receive protection from specific risks (like having one's house burn down or having to make payments in currencies other than those in which a firm earns its revenue) at a cost - an insurance premium. Likewise, the seller function as an insurer, taking on that risk in return for consideration (the premium paid). If the seller decides to lay off some or all of that risk, they seek reinsurance, by assigning the contract (selling it) or by purchasing an offsetting position. This can be done for all or part of a position.

The problem is that as the risk becomes dispersed throughout the financial system, those at teh center, the investment banks and their large clients - hedge funds and insurance firms, and some corporations - find themselves counterparties to everyone. If one fails, the insurance that they have offered becomes worthless, forcing the insured to recognize a loss from an exposure they had believed to be hedged. Once that loss appears, equity of the counterparties can be quickly wiped out and more selling and liquidation ensues.

In a very real sense, what structured finance has done is not only spread the risk widely, it has meant that when any sector has a major problem the effects are impossible to isolate, because, at the end of the day, through the banks, everyone becomes a counterparty to everyone else, and failure at one bank is enough to bring down the system.

I point out that this is not news, though many seem to be surprised by it. In 1998, LTCM, having suffered a $5 billion loss, nearly had its equity wiped out and it stood to default on over $100bn in trades. The effect of the write-downs on the markets would have been huge.

Why does this happen? Well, insurance is based on estimates of what is likely to happen. Most of the time, it's a good bet for the insurance company. They reliably collect premiums that are more than adequate to offset small losses on in the position taken. However, sometimes really big events happen and when they do there is a surprising amount of correlation among assets, particularly financial assets and particularly among assets of similar classes. This means that if you regularly issue insurance against a specific type of default - all of your claims are likely to come at the same time. This would be OK, were it the case that the insurer had the assets in place and that those assets were sufficiently liquid to ensure that conversion to cash to pay claims didn't lead to greater imbalance and higher losses.

Virtually no firm, and certainly no investment bank, which operate with massive leverage, has the balance sheet necessary. It requires huge stores of cash - and cash is not a big earner. High returns on equity and the big bonuses that come with them aren't earned with cash. If you own 1/3rd of the company and live in a nice house in Omaha, you might not care that much about holding cash (especially if you operate with an underwriting profit, in which case the cash is free), but if you work in NYC and are competing to have your kids get in the most prestigious pre-school and you rely on annual performance bonsuses to pay for your lifestyle then you don't want lots of cash sitting around. You need to keep dealing and generating fees.

This is not to knock the investment banks. Generating fees is a very good idea, since those profits can be used to offset the loses (if you can continue operations).

But what I want to caution against is the belief that the risk models used to predict the insurance payoffs are good. Even Alan Greenspan, a fan of structured finance - and asset bubbles - admits that overreliance on models is a problem. This is because of the Rumsfeldian "unknown unknowns" which are impossible to model, no matter how good we get at modeling "known unknowns". Worse, the moments that the models will be most useless will be precisely those moments when insurance is most needed, that is during crises when traditional risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) that depend on predicting the correlations among a series of risks, will break down.

I posted the first, unedited, and considerably less clear explanation, because I wanted to share my thoughts at the time. There has been evidence that my thinking on this was pretty good - the bank is selling for much less than its close on Friday (even I didn't think it would essentially go for liquidation value) and because I predicted more problems. The WSJ already hinted at problems at Lehman (though, thus far, it's speculation - on my part as well).

The Times of London is also insinuating that several leveraged hedge funds are near to collapse. This would also not surprise me. Leverage, so great on the way up is even more deadly on the way down. Long periods of being rewarded for taking increasing risks and getting paid less and less (but still getting paid) to take them inevitably leave one naked. And the tide is rushing out.

As an investor, I remain patiently on the sidelines. Right now, there is panic selling, knives are coming out and I'm not real interested in trying to catch it - never was that coordinated. The deleveraging that is underway will dramatically change the investing climate that we have come to know. It will truly be unlike anything we have seen in my lifetime.

Most of the old rules will be out of the window. I think there is still a great deal of reason to expect deflation and not inflation. As an investor, preparing oneself to thrive regardless of which scenario occurs is very tricky, but as always - the first rule is Hippocrates: "do no harm".

Has anyone else noticed

That the Nikkei has lost 1/3rd of its value since July?

I was checking market response to the news about Bear and I saw that the Nikkei had not only shed 450 points, but that it was trading below the Dow's Friday close. That got me thinking - hadn't the Nikkei been above the Dow recently. So I checked the chart and courtesy of Yahoo! Finance, I saw this.


I guess there is a great deal of concern about Japanese exporters and the US dollar. Or maybe just concern about Japanese exporters and the US economy in general. But is it really this bad? And if it is this bad, why is the US not showing similar declines? After all, Japan increasingly trades with East Asia so it's US leverage should be muted.

Thoughts?

Friday, March 14, 2008

Bear Stearns Bankruptcy?

Bear Stearns announced today that it would receive temporary (28 days) secured financing on an as needed basis for JP Morgan Chase and (indirectly) from the Federal Reserve.

The plan was announced as a response to a major liquidity crisis that has been ongoing since two hedge funds imploded in August. Bear remarked that

Bear Stearns has been the subject of a multitude of market rumors regarding our liquidity. We have tried to confront and dispel these rumors and parse fact from fiction. Nevertheless, amidst this market chatter, our liquidity position in the last 24 hours had significantly deteriorated.

Furthermore, they announced that they are in talks with JPM regarding "permanent financing or other alternatives."

This unusual financing structure will see that:

Through its Discount Window, the Fed will provide non-recourse, back-to-back financing to JPMorgan Chase

Read both statements here.

This essentially turns JP Morgan into conduit. The collateral for the loans will come from Bear Stearns. Should Bear default and the collateral fail to satisfy the outstanding loan to JP Morgan the Fed will take the loss. The loan is "non-recourse" which means that the Fed cannot pursue assets of JP Morgan to satisfy the debt.

This unusual step has been taken because, as an investment bank Bear Stearns is not eligible to borrow from the Fed, whereas JP Morgan, a commercial bank, is a member of the Federal Reserve System and does have that right.

The problem is transforming from one of liquidity to one of solvency. Investment banks tend to have extremely high leverage, much higher than that of commercial banks, because I-Banks rarely hold investment assets for long periods. They underwrite and need keep assets on the books only until they have sold them to clients or other syndicate members. Commercial and retail banks, by comparison, tend to hold loan portfolios as investments and so use more "modest" 9:1 leverage (I-Banks are often 25:1).

Obviously, with such high leverage rates even small declines in asset prices can wipe out equity on thinly capitalized balance sheets. Merging Bear out of existence would reduce the leverage of the portfolio, by combining it with the much healthier balance sheet of JPM.

Temporary revolving credit such as the Fed is extending can solve liquidity problems, but it cannot solve a solvency crisis. Nor can it resolve the bigger problem for stand alone I-Banks that they need to be able to sell their paper to someone, at a premium, not simply trade it for cash.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Economists agree: US is in a Recession

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that several prominent economists now agree that the US is in recession. In a recent survey the vote was 70% / 30% that the US has entered a recession. The turning point was apparently the payrolls decline from last week.

This is an interview with the WSJ's Phil Izzo, who wrote the story.




So far as I know, there is still no official word from the National Bureau of Economic Research, the "official" declarer of recessions.

A recession and job loss and a major increase in unemployment is certain to put further strain on the housing market in the US. All of the bricks are now falling into place for the worst economic catastrophe since the 1930s.

As usual, the Federal Reserve is largely to blame. It helped to bring about both the real estate booms of the 1920s and 2000s and the subsequent crashes.

As an investor, I continue to keep money in cash, because major economic downturns tend to produce deflation and not inflation (though inflatinary recessions are possible as the 1970s have taught us) and invest only in securities with firms who will do well regardless of economic cycles and monetary expansion or contraction (think consumer staples).

I believe that the housing market will be indicative of the investing climate going forward, liquidity will pay dividends - bargains will be available for investors who can "write the check". But there is no need to be hasty - scavenging cheap assets in 1932 was lots of fun, and profitable, if you had any money. We'll be saying the same things in 2025 about the investing opportunities of 2009-2011.

Friday, March 07, 2008

Stop waiting for the Housing Recovery

I wrote a post not long ago that housing prices have to overshoot to the downside before the fall in prices can stop. Today, Reuters caught on.

Quoting Mark Zandi of Economy.com, Reuters said:
Home buyers are not going to catch that falling knife and that's going to weigh very heavily on the housing market through this year and next.
Homebuyers have no incentive to purchase a home right now, as by waiting another month or six or 12, they can often find a comparable home (indeed, perhaps the same home) at a lower price, so why rush? But it is not only that: buyers have a huge disincentive to purchase - a leveraged asset whose price is falling will quickly wipe out any equity invested, unless one can purchase for cash.

The only way buyers can be enticed back into the market when buying represents a real advantage to renting. Thus, prices must overshoot below intrinsic value to the point where it becomes a "no brainer" to purchase, irrespective of the potential loss of equity.

This occurs when:

1. The (after tax) carrying costs of the real estate are lower than rents, or
2. Rental availability in specific segments (e.g. 4 bedroom residences) is too thin
3. The emotional value of owning a home becomes overwhelming

This process will take a long time because the costs of owning became extremely high. I admit that if my personal circumstances were different, though, I would be out shopping for foreclosures, REOs and desparate sellers, though looking for rental property and not a home.

Friday, February 29, 2008

Why I'm Focused on Capital Preservation

Almost exactly one year ago, I wrote an article predicting that the CDOs on many banks balance sheets (and off of them in SIVs and other conduits) were about to implode and this was going to make for some very tough time for financial companies. Essentially, I argued that banks would find that their balance sheets were overleveraged and be forced to liquidate assets (in many cases at bargain prices) in order to meet

My suggestion at the time was to keep the powder dry, since values were bound to begin popping up, eventually and in extremely unstable markets capital preservation and liquidity were the keys to success. He who has ready cash to deploy when everyone else is running for the hills can purchase terrific assets on the cheap.

A few days ago, I read an article that basically said that my thesis (which is shared by many) is an example of the usual nattering nabobs of negativity predicting the end of the world. The article, entitled How Banks Work, by Nathan Lewis of New World Economics, basically argued that the relative strength or weakness of banks balance sheets is not the major source of financial crises; it is borrowers’ willingness and ability to borrow which matters. Moreover he selected as his example Japan 1989-2003, my favourite example of monetary deflation because it happened with a modern central bank and all of the government statistical analysis available now that was not available in 1929-1933. This had me thinking – do I have it all wrong? Is the market far more resilient than I believe (in which case, I need to rethink my tactics)?

Let’s take a more in depth look at his claims. First, the issue that banks do not stop lending because they lack lending facilities (that is, banks don’t run out of money to lend). He states:

Typically, when banks have capital impairment (losses), there is much hue and cry that lending will shrink as a result, leading to recession. This is based on a very simple multiplication: banks typically have about 10:1 leverage. Their assets (mostly loans) are typically about 10x their capital base. So, this simple line of thinking goes, if capital shrinks by 20%, then loans must also shrink by 20% to keep the ratio in line. And indeed, the BIS capital ratio requirements mandate that large banks not get too far out of line regarding these ratios.

This was essentially my argument. But he counters:

But banks don't really work like that. This is a subset of a broader group of theories, that an economy can be managed by a sort of mechanical top-down monetarist approach. … They are all based on the idea that there is some amount of "money" (or capital), and everyone jumps up and down like puppets depending on this one quantity variable. Thus, if banks have capital, then they create loans according to some sort of inevitable mechanical multiplication function, and if they don't have capital then loans shrink by the same inevitable mechanical multiplication function.

The fact of the matter is that banks have indeed been forced to reduce their balance sheets. In fact, what we discovered in this process was that banks’ balance sheets were far weaker than we had been led to believe due to large off-balance sheet obligations. That the FASB and the SEC continue to allow this is amazing. Banks have been struggling to find means of raising liquidity so that they can continue to meet obligations and make new loans. They are struggling because other banks no longer trust the value of their collateral. So, bank balance sheet weakness does indeed lead to financial instability. It leads to higher rates and tighter credit conditions, under which borrowers may no longer find it attractive to borrow.

He goes on to argue that banks have a variety of ways to raise capital, which means that they will always have adequate funding for attractive investment opportunities. He says:

[W]hat if there were lots of wonderful loan opportunities, but banks today are unable to take advantage of them because of impaired capital? Well, they could then raise some more capital, which is exactly what they are doing. "We need capital to take advantage of this wonderful situation. If you buy an equity stake in our bank, we are sure you will enjoy a wonderful return on equity." … This is also an argument behind the sovereign wealth funds' recent investments in big US banks. "Well, they're having a hard time now, but they have fantastic franchises and have proven to be very profitable in the past. We'll bet on a winning horse, and when the situation turns around and there are more lending opportunities, the bank will make good money again."

This is true, so far as it goes. I for one believe that many large banks will probably be on sale (though smaller banks that rely more heavily on specific kinds of lending will continue to suffer). But the idea that there is plenty of capital outside of the US is belied by the fact that so many global banks are suffering in this crisis. Capital is being wiped out all over the world. (IKB a small German bank that focuses on real estate lending in Germany – IKB stands for Immobilien Kredit Bank, German for Real Estate Credit Bank) has become insolvent due to its exposure.

Of course, capital can always be raised on some terms. The question is, are those terms attractive? Thus when he concludes

[L]ending is not driven by capital, rather capital is driven by opportunities in the lending business

He elides over the fact that “attractive” opportunities are partially defined by the terms upon which one can obtain financing. A project that returns 15% might be attractive, but surely it is not if financing cannot be had for less than 20%.

The point he wants to make is that it is the absence of attractive opportunities that lead to a collapse of borrowing. Without borrowing banks lose out on two major income streams: interest margins and origination fees. He details how this happened in Japan. A collapse in asset prices led to a lack of interest in borrowing and indeed to a general monetary deflation in which aggregate demand failed to match the existing supply capacity in the economy.

Since monetary deflation makes borrowed money extremely expensive and since capacity was already sufficient to meet demand, there was no incentive to borrow. (Actually, operating cash flow is the normal source of investment income under monetary deflation, which is on reason why IT firms tend to hoard cash and not borrow. This is the world they face every day). Even interest rates near zero were insufficient. But this BEGS the question he doesn’t ask: how are banks approaching lending opportunities today?

The answer is not reassuring.

Banks are calling in and reducing all sorts of outstanding financing arrangements, particularly if those arrangements are linked to real estate. There are several examples. This means that many borrowers who have been using home equity as a crutch to maintain spending levels and lifestyle will find fewer options to do so. This suggests that aggregate demand will drop and as that happens, many firms will find that investing is simply unnecessary. Instead the focus will actually be on reducing financial and operating leverage so that supply can be matched to demand. Doing so takes time, so in the short run output is likely to exceed demand and prices will have to fall to clear the market. Monetary deflation is likely to result. Yes, I know that central banks and governments are falling all over themselves to create inflation, but I return to the BoJ and its experience in Japan. Low rates do not guarantee attractive terms.

Why will banks do this? Contrary to Mr Lewis’ thesis, banks do not like to float new capital, even if they can. They much prefer increasing the balance sheet through retained earnings. Having to tap the general markets or strategic investors like sovereign wealth funds, is expensive. Those investors are in a position to demand high returns on their capital. It is the benefit of having capital to offer when no one else does. Beggars cannot be choosers.

This is why my approach has been, and continues to be, to keep cash on hand and scour the markets for attractive opportunities. They need not be stocks. I am myself looking at a few possibilities in common stocks (more on this in anther post). Because of some decisions that I made in 2006, I am not looking at real estate right now, but I will be before long. I see this market as a real buying opportunity – but only for selective purchases.

Mr Lewis is making an argument against a massive federal bank bailout. I support his thesis: banks and investors cannot go to the casino and then only keep the winning bets. They pocketed the fees and got the dividends and the buybacks. Why should taxpayers share the burden (unless the financial system becomes so ossified that the payment system breaks down. This is not impossible. In such a case, taxpayers should be glad to pay the price to prevent the complete implosion of credit markets). But he supposes that the markets and the pundits are being too pessimistic (and that the banks, looking for the losing bet insurance, are the source). Credit markets are indeed becoming much tighter, however, and this means that it is wrong to assume that investors aren’t being rational in their perception of heightened risk.

This credit cycle is going to produce a great deal of pain. No one knows exactly how it will turn out. We have never had so many alternative financial products with various risk profiles as we have today. The models aren’t working, so irrationality is coming to the fore. I continue to maintain large cash balances – and believe me it is no fun earning peanuts on those balances. But I am willing to be patient and selective and purchase from Mr Market those assets about which he is unnecessarily pessimistic.

Monday, February 25, 2008

Lowest existing home sales in years

Yahoo! Finance is reporting that existing home sales have fallen to a nine year low. This means that sales have returned to the level of 1999. Seasonally adjusted sales remained below 5 million for the first time this decade. You can get the data from the National Association of realtors as a PDF here and as an MS Excel sheet here. One way to look at this is that, after now reaching multi-year lows, housing must be do to reach a bottom soon. The other view is to view 1999 as a pretty good year in the housing market (it was) and to argue that even with the long fall, housing has only just returned to long-term trend sales figures. This view holds that while we may have returned to “normal” conditions, we have not yet begun to work off the excesses of the boom. Thus, housing is likely to continue to head lower and underperform other assets, likely for years with yet lower prices required to clear the market.

Naturally, the irrepressible Lawrence Yun and the National Association of Realtors take the first (more optimistic) view. They have chosen to spin the numbers and call yet another bottom to the housing market. They do this by simultaneously focusing on the (un-annualized) month over month decline, which is less than ½ of 1 percent and simultaneously talking up phantom demand that is simply waiting for a “catalyst” – in this case the increase in the ceiling of conforming mortgages, which will enable homeowners with mortgages larger that $417.000 to obtain a mortgage backed by Fannie Mae or Freddic Mac.


In fact, if anything this report confirms that housing will continue to decline for the foreseeable future. The 0.4% decline over December represents a pretty steep decline year over year. And, in the datasheets provided, it becomes clear that housing is now much slower than last January: the year-over-year comparison (the only one which matters) shows a 23% decline in the number of homes sold and a 4.6% decline in median home prices (with a smaller decline in average home prices).


What the data say in clear terms is that even significant price discounts (a 5% fall is huge: final prices exclude other incentives like closing costs paid by the seller or upgrades to kitchens, bathrooms and the like) buyers are simply unwilling to do deals. Inventory remains extremely high. After dropping over the holidays, units on the market have increased and inventory again surged above 10 months supply. More houses are likely to come on the market in the next few months as the foreclosures mount. More inventory and more sales by banks rather than homeowners, suggest that prices will continue to fall and sales will continue to decline.

Buyers will naturally be reluctant to purchase for the same reason that they were so desperate to purchase during the boom: the effect of leverage. If one is able to put down 10% on a home and experience 5% appreciation per year, the leverage provides the buyer with a 50% gain. During the boom, prices regularly increased by 11-15% per year providing an annual gain of 100% or more. With even an even lower or no down payment returns became magnified to even greater extent.

But let us return to that same buyer today. A buyer who can qualify for a conforming mortgage, and who has 20% down is staring at a first year loss of 25%. If the trend continues for two years that same buyer is out 9.75% of the purchase price and has succeeded in wiping out nearly half his capital. Better to keep renting and hold onto the principal. A buyer with 10% or less to put down would have his entire equity wiped out in the first year. The NAR is hoping that buyers who already own homes and who are looking to trade up to a substantial home, $500k or more, will return to the market and generate more sales at the high end. If this were to happen the owner would likely list his current home, which means that no inventory would be removed. The problem remains without first time homebuyers there is no one to clear the inventory and right now there are no first time buyers.

Going inside of the numbers

Let’s move beyond theory and see what the numbers suggest.

This chart (created by the Center for Economic Policy Research using data from the US Census Bureau) shows the vacancy rate for home (both rentals and owned homes) is a clear indication of the source and magnitude of the current problem: there are too many residences and not enough families to occupy them. With a sharp reduction of interest rates in 2001-2003, rental vacancies soared.


The vacancy rate, which had remained fairly stable between 7.5 and 8% decade, leaped to 11% in two years. The decline was both so strong and so sudden that rents actually declined (lower rents suggested deflation in the CPI calculation, which reinforced the argument to keep rates low!). At the same time, home vacancies remained quite stable, virtually a flat line. With many renters shifting to being homeowners, we might expect home vacancies to be falling. That this did not happen shows how rapidly new home construction was running. By 2004, the rush was on to condo convert every apartment building in America. This finally brought rental vacancies down (by eliminating rental stock from the market - not by finding new renters) and the rise in vacant homes began. Many of these units were purchased in anticipation of future price increases and, as we can now see, nearly 3% of owned homes are vacant. But selling or renting these homes will not fix the basic problem: the surplus of residences. We may see arbitrage back and forth between rental units and owned units (condo conversions or rental of purchased condos). It doesn't matter because vacancy rates in both rented and owned homes are much higher than in 2000. This problem will not be resolved until positive absorption can be restored. Even then, the process will take years.


So how low can housing go?

This is the big question. Let's see if we can get inside some of the numbers to make a sensible projection. Before we do, I want to point out that housing corrections are slow to unfold and resolve. The negative impact of leverge and the stress that the losses put on the banking system require years to resolve and sometimes decades. Japan has yet to recover from the property boom of the 1980s.

I take as a principle that housing sales is a mean reverting series with a bias toward a long term rise. Population and household creation in the US are growing, albeit slowly, which leads to a rise in the need for homes (and generally, though not necessarily, owned homes). If the series is mean reverting however, we should expect that a series that experiences a spike outside of the normal range to experience an offsetting dip. So, where is the market now? That depends on how far back you look.

There are two basic series of housing data. The first is existing home sales. (These are the numbers reported by the NAR above). Unfortunately, the NAR charges for data beyond 12 months. (If anyone has the data series going back a ways and is willing to share, please contact me). The second series is the New Home Sales, which is available from the US Census Bureau. I used the publicly available dataseries from Economagic. The publicly available information is excellent and there are some free chart generators (gif and pdf) There is also a premium subscription available which allows for more data series and more customization of the charts and a direct export of the data series to MS Excel for analysis.

Back to the data. If I were the realtors, I would want to use this chart. Yes, it paints an extremely grim picture of new home sales since the middle of 2006. However, the chart suggests that we have returned to the level of home construction prevalent before the housing bull market started around 1995. Furthermore, new home sales are well below the long germ trend presented here. Given the weakness of new home building in the early 1990s, it could be reasoned that we are now sopping up excess demand and are poised to make a comeback.


The problem with this chart is that the long-term trend is broken, but there is no comparable data series to use to estimate how far this knife is going to fall. Let's take a longer term view with a goal of establishing a) how long housing markets stay down and b) how much of a decline in sales activity we tend to experience and how much of a decline in prices we tend to experience. With that, let us see if we can figure out where we are in the housing cycle.

The data series are available back as far as 1964. If you import the data to Excel and run an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, you find that the best fit is a polynomial (i.e. not a linear) trendline. Excel proposes this graph:



I find this graph amazing because it shows two things. First, that the housing boom of the 1980s, which peaks in 1987, only represented a return to trend (the peak falls right on the trend line). The impact of the financing crisis that resulted from the aftermath the rapid surge in sales (an increase of about 62%) led to a 10 year period where sales failed to re-attain the volumes at the peak. The trendline also suggests that we have only just returned to the trend line. To put it another way, the decline from 2005 to late 2007 was only the return to long-term trend activity. As a mean-reverting series, it can be seen that we are only at the beginning of the backing and filling necessary to work off the excess.

In fact this peak seems to show more similarity to the 1970s boom, which was driven primarily by the massive growth in household expansion from the Baby Boomers. There has been some discussion of the potential for new sales from the “Echo Boom”, but as noted above, first time buyers have no incentive to enter the market.

One further point, this trend line is quite distorted because the data series is short. If we had more historical data, we would likely see a flatter and more linear curve. This would serve to reduce the amount that sales in the 1970s were “above trend” but would also INCREASE the amount that recent sales are above trend. It is possible that we have YET to return to trend, though I think we are probably close. That chart would look more like this:

So how long are we likely to wait?

I believe that sales are likely to continue to decline over the next 18-24 months. Prices will likewise continue to decline, but that by 2010-2011 we are likely to reach bottom. Most of the earlier peaks and troughs are 4-5 years apart. This would put the bottom somewhere in 2009-2010. This boom is larger than the previous ones, so the down-cycle could be longer. However, the data seem to suggest that the decline is likely to be much sharper. In other words, the fall will be much greater, but will occur over the same time period so the curve will be much steeper.

What can we expect on prices?

Here the news is even more sobering than on volumes. Home prices soared very, very far about the long-term trend. Ironically, one of the usual appeals of real estate investing is that price levels tend to increase at very consistent rates, about in line with wages (which are the big limiter on the amount people can borrow). Even the surge in prices of the 1980s is a comparable mild and look at how long prices remained below trend thereafter. After 1997, however prices began accelerating.

This chart suggests that prices must continue to decline, at least another 5% just to return to trend, but that prices are unlikely to begin rising again once the trend is reached. In fact, it is quite likely that prices will undershoot similarly to overshooting. If that were to happen, prices would have to fall 20-25% below trend and remain below trend until 2012-2013 at a minimum. From here, then, we should expect a 25%-30% decline from here. This means that unless you can get a deal, or have more than 25% to put down, or you can be quite sure that you will not need to move in the next 6-7 years, or you have the ability to ensure adequate cash flow (including a cushion should rents begin falling again) investing in real estate is a losing proposition.

If you already own, but have adequate cash flow and don’t mind just collecting rent checks, you don’t need to sell. If you need to sell, it might be better to do it now rather than risk braving the market 12-24 months from now.

I know many people think the market will come back soon. I still believe that the only true analog to this housing phenomenon is Japan from 1989-2004. After a similarly foolish bubble in asset prices, asset prices declined for 15 years. It probably won’t be that bad: regulators in Japan were painfully slow to force banks to clean up their balance sheets and most banks in the US seem to be moving with reasonable speed. But it is worth noting that every quarter involves yet another massive charge from UBS, Citi, JP Morgan and now Credit Suisse.

If you have cash and credit, you can start looking, but you MUST focus on cash flow. Capital appreciation will not happen for years. A 10-year IRR calculation should assume NEGATIVE capital gain. Thus, cash flow returns must be quite adequate. This is also necessary to ensure that you will not be forced to sell the property in the event of a decline in rental prices (which may happen if many other investors follow similar bottom-feeding strategies). Finally, consider if you have the resources to upgrade and remodel in the event that you find your neighborhood becomes competitive.